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Abstract In recent years, the microfinance industry has
received a substantial amount of cross-border funding from
both public and private sources. This funding reflects the
increasing interest in microfinance as part of a more gen-
eral trend towards socially responsible investments. In
order to be able to secure sustained interest from these
investors, it is important that the microfinance industry can
show evidence of its contribution to reducing poverty at the
bottom of the pyramid. For this, it is crucial to understand
under what conditions microfinance institutions (MFIs) are
able to reduce poverty. This paper contributes to this dis-
cussion by investigating the relationship between the extent
to which social capital formation is facilitated within dif-
ferent societies and the financial and social performance of
MFIs. This focus on social capital formation is important,
because in many cases MFIs use group loans with joint
liability to incentivize asset-poor borrowers to substitute
the lack of physical collateral by their social capital.
Hence, the success of a large part of the loan relationship
between MFIs and their borrowers depends on the social
capital those borrowers can bring into the contract. We
carry out a cross-country analysis on a dataset containing
100 countries and identify different social dimensions as
proxies for how easy social capital can be developed in
different countries. We hypothesize that microfinance is
more successful, both in terms of their financial and social
aims, in societies that are more conducive to the develop-
ment of social capital. Our empirical results support our
hypothesis.
Keywords Microfinance  Social capital  Financial
performance  Social performance
Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) focus on providing
financial services, in most cases by offering (very) small
loans, to poor households that are excluded from the
formal financial system. The practice of microcredit
started in the mid-1970s and since then it has grown
rapidly. The market for microcredit has been booming,
especially since the early 2000s. Although the global
financial crisis led to a reduction of the growth of
microfinance activities (Wagner and Winkler 2013),
microfinance has remained high on the agenda of policy
makers as a potentially important instrument to reduce
poverty. The main driver of its growth has been the belief
that having access to finance is crucial for the poor as this
helps them to smooth their consumption, generate busi-
ness opportunities, and improve their inclusion in the
formal economy in the long run (Collins et al. 2009). By
facilitating self-employment and entrepreneurship, access
to credit would help the poor to lift themselves out of
poverty (Morduch 1999; Armenda´riz and Labie 2011).
For this reason, some have argued that the microfinance
industry should be seen as ethically progressive (Hudon
and Sandberg 2013). Others have made the claim that
microfinance is ‘‘…one of the fastest growing corporate
social responsibility (CSR) tools in the finance sector’’
(Pohl and Tolhurst 2010, p. 180).
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In recent years, however, microfinance industry has
become subject of increasing criticism. In fact, some even
go as far as claiming that the industry is currently facing an
ethical crisis (Hudon 2011). This crisis was triggered by a
number of events, starting in 2007 with the critical atten-
tion the Mexican MFI Compartamos received when it was
found out that its financial success was at least partly based
on interest rates in excess of 100 % their clients had to pay
(Lewis 2008). Also in 2007, an authoritative impact study
was published, showing that microcredit does not con-
tribute to improving the living conditions of the poor
(Banerjee et al. 2013). This study was followed by several
other impact studies showing little evidence that micro-
credit has a positive impact on poverty reduction.1 And
finally, in 2010, MFIs in India were accused of using
exploitative lending techniques and using forceful loan
recovery practices, leading to the suicide of several Indian
MFI clients (Biswas 2010; Mader 2013).
Notwithstanding the criticism microfinance has
received, the sector still obtains a substantial amount of
cross-border funding.2 The largest part of this funding is
from public sources (e.g., multilateral institutions, gov-
ernmental donors, etc.), but private funding from com-
mercial banks, pension funds insurance companies, private
equity firms, etc. has been growing and has actually grown
at a faster rate than that of public funders during recent
years (El-Zoghbi et al. 2011).3 This growth reflects the
increasing interest in microfinance as part of a more gen-
eral trend towards socially responsible investments (SRI).
These investments, combining investors’ financial objec-
tives with concerns about environmental, social, and gov-
ernance issues, have become increasingly popular around
the world.
In order to be able to secure sustained interest from
these investors, it is important that MFIs can show evi-
dence of their contribution to reducing poverty at the bot-
tom of the pyramid. For this, it is crucial to understand
under what conditions MFIs are able to contribute to
poverty reduction (i.e., their business model is socially
sustainable) and when they can reach this for the longer
term (i.e., their business model is financially sustainable).
In this respect, MFIs are often characterized as hybrid
institutions (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Morduch 1999).
The current study can be seen in this light as we contribute
to the literature on the determinants of the financial and
social performance of MFIs.
From its start in the 1970s, a large part of the micro-
credit offered to the poor has been characterized by inno-
vative lending methodologies implemented by MFIs in
order to increase the probability of repayment of loans. In
many cases, these MFIs use the so-called group loans with
joint liability to incentivize asset-poor borrowers to sub-
stitute the lack of physical collateral by their social capital.
Hence, the success of a large part of the relationship
between MFIs and their borrowers depends on the social
capital those borrowers can bring into the contract.
To explain the drivers of the financial and social per-
formance of MFIs, research has mostly focused on insti-
tution-specific factors, such as the type of loans issued,
governance, and the formal type of the institution (see, e.g.,
Mersland et al. 2011), as well as on macroeconomic factors
and the formal institutional context (see Ahlin et al. 2011;
Hermes and Meesters 2011). Yet, there is very little evi-
dence with respect to how country-level disparities in terms
of social capital availability are related to the MFI
performance.
This may be due to the difficulty of quantifying the
different facets of social capital. Nahapiet and Ghoshal
(1998) summarize these different facets into three cate-
gories: structural social capital (the presence or absence of
relationships between individuals, the configuration of their
networks, the characteristics of interpersonal connections,
such as network connectivity, density), relational social
capital (the type of relationship developed through past
social interactions, like respect, trust, acceptance, friend-
ship, sociability), and cognitive social capital (shared
norms and languages, shared narratives).
A few studies have recently engaged in proxying social
determinants of MFI performance through measurements
such as generalized social trust or various cultural dimen-
sions (see, e.g., Karlan 2007; Burzynska and Berggren
2015; Manos and Tsytrinbaum 2014). However, no study
has looked at how MFI performance is predicted by the
extent to which social contexts facilitate the formation of
social capital. Building on Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998),
we argue that social capital formation is facilitated by
social determinants such as trust (i.e., relational social
capital) or shared cultural aspects (i.e., cognitive social
capital) and hypothesize that social capital-based lending
contracts are likely to be more successful in societies where
less hurdles are encountered in the process of social capital
accumulation.
Research has indicated that copying the social capital-
based lending models to different contexts may not always
be successful. For example, Masanjala (2002), based on a
1 See Bauchet et al. (2011) for an overview of these impact studies
and a summary of their findings.
2 For example, in 2009 (i.e., in the middle of the global financial
crisis and just 2 years after the criticism on microfinance started to
emerge) total funding reached US$21.3 billion, which was 17 %
higher than the total cross-border flows for 2008 (El-Zoghbi et al.
2011).
3 Recent examples of the storng interest of private investors for
investing in microfinance are the very successful IPOs of Ujjivan
Financial Services and Equitas Holdings, two Indian MFIs. Both IPOs
attracted substantial investor interest as they were 41 and 17 times
oversubscribed, respectively (Money Control 2016; Juhasz 2016).
428 L. Postelnicu, N. Hermes
123
study of the performance of a Grameen-type MFI in
Malawi, questions the replicability of Grameen-type banks
in Africa. Walker (2012) comes to a similar conclusion
based on a study of a Grameen-type bank in the Comoros.
These studies suggest that it may indeed be relevant to look
at differences between societies in terms of how social
capital formation is facilitated, in order to understand the
success/failure of social capital-based lending models. To
our knowledge, no research looks at the link between MFI
performance and the extent to which social capital for-
mation is facilitated within a society. Our study may shed
light on the characteristics of the social contexts in which
microfinance can be successful.
This paper aims to fill this research gap. We use three
different categories of indicators as proxies for the three
social capital facets described by Nahapiet and Ghoshal
(1998). First, we look at the degree of individualization of a
society as a proxy for the extent to which the formation of
social capital structures (i.e., the formation of relationships
between individuals, the configuration of their networks,
their network connectivity, density, etc.) is facilitated.
Second, we look at generalized trust as a measure of how
easy relational social capital can be formed. Third, we look
at the fractionalization of different societies to get an
approximation of how easy cognitive social capital may be
developed in those societies. We use data from MFIs active
in 100 countries to investigate the relationship between
these three categories of proxies and the financial and
social performance of MFIs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
‘‘Social Capital and the Performance of MFIs’’ section
gives an overview of the importance of social capital for
the success of microfinance, whereas ‘‘Hypotheses’’ section
develops our hypotheses. The data and empirical method-
ology used are presented in ‘‘Methodology and Data’’
section. The descriptive statistics are discussed in ‘‘De-
scriptive Statistics’’ section, followed by the presentation
of the results of the econometric analysis in ‘‘Econometric
Results’’ section. ‘‘Summary and Concluding Remarks’’
section concludes.
Social Capital and the Performance of MFIs
MFIs offer a range of financial services to poor households
and small businesses (SMEs). The most important of these
services is lending. Just like commercial banks, MFIs are
confronted with asymmetric information with respect to the
repayment capacity and/or repayment willingness of their
potential borrowers. These borrowers have better infor-
mation about the quality of the projects in which they
invest the money they receive from the MFI, allowing them
to make a better judgment of the probability of loan
repayment. Commercial banks as well as MFIs try to
reduce the problem of asymmetric information using var-
ious mechanisms. Commercial banks invest in screening
and monitoring practices by collecting and evaluating hard
information, such as formal records on assets and liabili-
ties, income statements, salary specifications. In addition,
they usually demand valuable collateral. Moreover, in
countries with a well-developed law and property right
system, they may recover the loan by going to court once a
loan is not repaid.
MFIs use different methods to reduce problems of
asymmetric information as they mostly deal with bor-
rowers who are poor and have small loans. Screening and
monitoring of this type of clients is generally costly due
to the fixed cost nature of these activities. Moreover,
information regarding these borrowers is opaque and
more difficult to evaluate as formal records on assets and
liabilities, salary, etc., are usually non-existent. In addi-
tion, poor borrowers and SMEs have no valuable physical
collateral. Finally, MFIs are usually active in countries
with an under-developed law and property right system,
which makes it difficult to recover the loan by going to
court.
MFIs solve problems of asymmetric information using
soft information. One strategy to collect soft information is
to have loan officers visit potential and existing clients to
verify repayment capacity and probability, as well as to
collect interest payments and repayment of the loan. The
direct contact these loan officers have with their clients
reduces asymmetric information problems. Through fre-
quent interactions, loan officers may also accumulate social
capital in their relationships with their clients. This leads to
higher reciprocity, and, thus, to less opportunistic behavior
and higher repayment willingness.
Another strategy MFIs frequently use is providing loans
to groups of borrowers instead of individuals. In the con-
text of the so-called group-lending model, group members
are jointly liable to repay the loans taken up by individual
group members. This provides incentives to group mem-
bers to screen and monitor each other as the group’s
repayment determines the contributions individuals have to
make to repay existing loans and/or have access to future
loans. Since group members usually live close to each
other in villages or urban districts, they are closely con-
nected through social networks. These social networks
provide the necessary soft information based on which
screening and monitoring can be carried out effectively,
thus reducing asymmetric information. Moreover, the net-
works provide a context allowing group members to
enforce loan repayment of fellow group members. Group
lending with joint liability can be seen as a substitute for
the need to invest in screening and monitoring by the MFI.
This lending model creates the so-called social collateral,
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which helps improving the repayment of the borrowers of
these institutions.
Thus, the lending techniques used by MFIs are based on
exchange relations where social capital plays an important
role. These techniques are used because for most of their
clients MFIs are confronted with information opacity, i.e.,
they have to deal with the lack of widely available and
transparent information on the characteristics of their cli-
ents. Social capital makes transactions possible in such an
environment. Borrowers living in environments that stim-
ulate and facilitate the social capital accumulation may
thus have higher stocks of social capital that they can use to
substitute for lack of hard information and valuable phys-
ical collateral. Therefore, based on our discussion of the
mechanisms underlying the provision of microfinance to
poor households and SMEs, we expect that MFIs active in
environments conducive to social capital development
have better financial and social performance.
Several papers have investigated the importance of
social capital in explaining the repayment performance of
microfinance clients. The majority of these studies find a
positive relationship between social capital and repayment,
although there are some notable exceptions. Wydick (1999)
uses information from an MFI in Guatemala and focuses on
the extent to which group members know each other before
they enter a borrowing group, whether they are friends,
and/or whether they partake in joint social activities as
measures of social ties between group members. He does
not find evidence that stronger social ties are associated
with better repayment performance of borrowers. Hermes
et al. (2005) focus on microfinance in Eritrea and use
similar measures of social ties. Their research shows that
social ties help group leaders to improve their screening
and monitoring efforts, resulting in lower incidences of
repayment problems of group members. Karlan’s (2007)
study is situated in Peru and measures social ties by
looking at the extent to which group members share the
same culture and/or live more closely to each other. His
analysis suggests that social ties measured in this way are
associated with better repayment performance. Ahlin and
Townsend (2007) use survey data from borrowers of
BAAC, an MFI in Thailand. Their measure of social ties
(they label this as cooperation) focuses on the extent to
which group borrowers are willing to share money and free
labor, and to what extent they are willing to coordinate the
transportation of crops, the purchase of inputs, and sales of
crops. They find a negative association between ties and
repayment, a result that has not been reported in other
studies. According to Ahlin and Townsend (2007), social
ties may improve repayment when these ties help
strengthening the effective use of penalties against those
group members who fail to repay, whereas it reduces
repayment in cases ties discourage the use of such
penalties. Cassar et al. (2007), using survey data from
borrowers in South Africa and Armenia, measure social
capital within borrowing groups by focusing on group
homogeneity and intra-group trust, and show that both
these measures are positively associated with repayment
performance. In a series of studies, Dufhues et al.
(2011a, b, 2012, and 2013) measure social capital based on
social network analysis, using information from borrowing
households in Thailand and Vietnam. The results of these
studies suggest that social capital is associated with better
repayment performance, depending on the nature of social
ties between individuals. Wydick et al. (2011) is one of the
few studies focusing on how social capital can help
increasing the social performance of MFIs. In particular,
they show that religious networks are important for rural
households in Guatemala to have access to credit.
The above-mentioned studies all use data from a single
country context (except Cassar et al. 2007, who use data
from two countries). They do not allow for looking at
country variations in terms of how social capital develop-
ment is facilitated. Recently, a small number of studies has
emerged that focus on various social measurements, such
as trust or culture. Burzynska and Berggren (2015) focus
on the relationship between trust and a collectivist cultural
dimension, and the financial performance (i.e., repayment
rates, costs, and interest rates) of MFIs. Using information
for 331 MFIs in 37 countries for the period 2003–2011,
they find that MFIs in countries with higher levels of trust
and/or a more collectivist culture on average have lower
costs and lower interest rates. Manos and Tsytrinbaum
(2014) focus on different measures of culture as determi-
nants of financial and social performance. They use data
for 852 MFIs from 30 countries during the period
2000–2010 and find that culture is a significant determinant
of MFI financial and social performance and that the
strength of the association between culture and perfor-
mance depends on the type of cultural values and beliefs.
Sundeen and Johnson (2012) investigate to what extent
social capital (defined by them as social networks, norms,
and trustworthiness) affects financial and social perfor-
mance of MFIs. Their sample covers almost 2000 MFI in
115 countries between 1995 and 2011. The results suggest
that social capital does affect MFI performance and that
there is a trade-off between financial and social perfor-
mance. Aggarwal et al. (2015) focus on analyzing whether
social dimensions (i.e., trust and culture) influence the
extent to which MFIs lend to female borrowers. They find
that in low-trust countries MFIs lend more to women as
compared to MFIs in high-trust countries. This suggests
that MFIs use targeting women as borrowers as a lending
strategy to substitute for the low level of trust in a society,
as women are generally seen as more trustworthy bor-
rowers. Finally, in a related study Mersland et al. (2013)
430 L. Postelnicu, N. Hermes
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focus on the religious background of MFIs and their per-
formance. Using data from a sample of 405 MFIs operating
in 73 countries from 2001 to 2010, they find that MFIs with
a Christian background have significantly lower funding
costs and consistently underperform in terms of financial
profit indicators as compared to secular MFIs. In terms of
loan repayment performance and average loan size (a
measure of outreach), both types of MFIs perform the
same, however.
We build on these recent cross-country studies analyz-
ing the relationship between social determinants such as
trust and cultural dimensions, and MFI performance. To
explain how MFI performance is determined by social
capital, we start from the framework developed by Naha-
piet and Ghoshal (1998), which integrates the different
facets of social capital to define it in terms of three distinct
dimensions: structural social capital, relational social
capital, and cognitive social capital. Structural social cap-
ital refers to the overall pattern of connections between
individuals (the presence or absence of social ties between
individuals, the network configuration, the network den-
sity, connectivity, etc.). Relational social capital describes
the personal relationship that individuals develop through
multiple social interactions over time, such as respect,
friendship, sociability, approval, and prestige. Cognitive
social capital reflects the shared norms, languages, systems
of meaning, and the shared narratives.
While structural social capital encapsulates the charac-
teristics of the social structure, relational and cognitive
social capital constitute the aspects that facilitate the
actions and interactions of individuals within the social
structure. Thus, social capital is embedded in social
structures and is owned jointly by the members of the
social structure (i.e., no member can unilaterally own her/
his social structure).
Hypotheses
In this section, we propose concrete social determinants to
measure the three social capital dimensions identified by
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), and develop our hypotheses
on the expected relationships between these determinants
and the MFI financial and social performance.
We expect a positive association between the financial
and social performance of MFIs and the social dimensions
that facilitate the social capital formation. As explained in
‘‘Social Capital and the Performance of MFIs’’ section,
unlike traditional banking, MFIs give access to loans to
asset-poor individuals by allowing them to replace the
physical collateral by their social capital. By relying on
social capital, repayment of loans is improved, which
positively contributes to the financial performance of
MFIs. Moreover, relying on social capital allows them to
be more socially oriented (which at least formally is their
primary mission), as the availability of social collateral
reduces the information opaqueness that is generally
associated with providing financial services to poorer
borrowers, i.e., they can better lend smaller loans as
compared to traditional banks, and can better reach the
asset-poor individuals without access to traditional banks
(with a particular focus on women). Thus, we expect MFIs
to perform better, both financially and socially, in societies
where social capital formation is facilitated. Individuals
living in societies where the development of social capital
is hampered may not have the necessary stocks of social
capital to ensure the success of microcredit. Hence, we
expect lower financial performance of MFIs active in these
societies. At the same time, due to the lack of reliable
stocks of social capital, MFIs may get a more commer-
cially oriented focus and may not be able to reach their
intended social aims (i.e., to lend lower loan amounts to
mainly women).
As for the outcome variables, we focus on three
dimensions of social and financial performance, i.e., the
share of female borrowers, the average loan size relative to
GNI per capita, and the operational self-sufficiency. The
first two measures relate to social performance, the third is
a measure of financial performance of MFIs. A higher
value for the operational self-sufficiency ratio is associated
with better financial performance of MFIs. If MFIs provide
more loans to women and/or if they provide smaller loans,
this is seen as showing better social performance. These
financial and social performance measures, although not
perfect, are standard in the microfinance literature (see,
e.g., Ahlin et al. 2011; Hermes and Meesters 2011; Manos
and Tsytrinbaum 2014).
To investigate how easy/difficult social capital can be
formed in different environments, we look at the following
three dimensions: fractionalization of society, generalized
trust, and individualism. The fractionalization of different
societies may lead to disparities in terms of how easy/
difficult cognitive social capital (shared codes and lan-
guages, shared narratives) can be formed. The generalized
trust proxies the formation of relational social capital as a
function of social interaction. We take the individualism
index as a measure for the extent to which formation of
social capital structures (i.e., the formation of relationships
between individuals, the configuration of their networks,
their network connectivity, density, etc.) is facilitated in a
society.
Fractionalization
Fractionalization of society refers to the probability that
two randomly drawn individuals coming from the same
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country are not from the same ethnic, religious, or lin-
guistic group. The higher this probability, the higher is the
level of fractionalization. In the economic growth litera-
ture, fractionalization is associated with political instabil-
ity, weak institutions, and poor macroeconomic
performance. Fractionalization is expected to reduce the
development of cognitive social capital (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). When a society is highly fractionalized,
this means that a large number of linguistic, religious, and/
or ethnic groups live together. The differences between
groups in such a society may lead to smaller in-group
networks and distrust of one group versus other groups.
Moreover, beliefs, norms, and values may differ between
groups as well. Vaessen and Bastiaensen (1999) argue that
when local social structures are sufficiently integrated,
norms, perceptions, and ideologies can circulate freely
among the different social actors, thus leading to positive
social capital accumulation. Hence, homogeneity of local
social structures, or low fractionalization, may contribute
to developing structural social capital and support eco-
nomic growth.
Based on this discussion of the association between
fractionalization and social capital formation, in combina-
tion with our expectation that higher levels of social capital
are associated with better financial and social performance
of MFIs, we hypothesize that lower fractionalization leads
to better financial and social performance. As MFIs’ social
and financial performance relies on the social capital
pledged by their borrowers, we expect a negative rela-
tionship between fractionalization and MFI financial and
social performance. First of all, fractionalized societies are
likely to produce lower stocks of social capital, which
renders the social collateral-backed lending less successful.
Thus, in these societies it may be less likely for the threat
of a social sanction in case of delinquent behavior to be
credible, which reduces the probability of loan repayments.
Moreover, less social collateral also means less social
support in case of economic problems, again reducing the
probability that borrowers will pay back their loans. This
leads to the expectation that MFIs may achieve worse-off
financial performance in fractionalized societies. Second,
because the availability of social collateral reduces the
information opaqueness that is associated with providing
financial services to poorer borrowers, MFIs active in
fractionalized countries may be less successful in achieving
social goals. In other words, we expect that MFIs in less-
fractionalized countries can reach more women with lower
loan sizes than MFIs that are active in fractionalized
countries.
Thus, we derive the following hypotheses:
H1a Operational self-sufficiency is negatively associated
with fractionalization (i.e., linguistic, ethnic, religious);
H1b Female borrowing is negatively associated with
fractionalization (i.e., linguistic, ethnic, religious); and
H1c The loan size is positively associated with frac-
tionalization (i.e., linguistic, ethnic, religious).
Generalized Trust
Generalized trust is defined as trust towards strangers,
which arises when ‘‘… a community shares a set of moral
values in such a way as to create regular expectations of
regular and honest behavior’’ (Fukuyama 1995). General-
ized trust is different from particularized trust, because it is
extended to people ‘‘… on whom the trusting part has no
direct information’’ (Bjørnskov 2006). The extent to which
generalized trust is prevalent in a society is expected to be
positively associated with developing relational social
capital. In particular, we expect that higher levels of gen-
eralized trust are conducive to a faster development of
friendships through social interactions, higher levels of
respect and acceptance between individuals, and swifter
sociability among individuals. Indeed, Realo and Allik
(2009) point out that when trust ‘‘… is limited to the
nuclear family or kinship alone, people have lower levels
of social capital. Social capital increases as the radius of
trust widens to encompass a larger number of people and
social networks, ridging the ‘gap’ between the family and
state.’’ Knack and Keefer (1997) show there is a positive
association between trust and social capital.
If we combine these findings regarding the association
between generalized trust and social capital formation with
our discussion regarding the relationship between social
capital and the financial and social performance of MFIs,
we may develop the following hypotheses:
H2a Operational self-sufficiency is positively associated
with generalized trust;
H2b Female borrowing is positively associated with
generalized trust; and
H2c The loan size is negatively associated with gener-
alized trust.
In other words, we expect that the social capital backed
lending model performs better (both in terms of financial
and social objectives) in societies where the development
of relational social capital is facilitated.
Individualism
Next, we look at individualism as a proxy for how easy/
difficult structural social capital (i.e., social networks) can
be formed within a society. Individualism is one of several
dimensions of the cultural setting of a society, which has
432 L. Postelnicu, N. Hermes
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been developed by Hofstede (2001).4 According to Hofst-
ede (2001) culture refers to the collective programming of
the mind that distinguishes members of one group from
another. It defines what represents acceptable and/or
desirable behavior within the group and accordingly can
help group members make decisions and/or judge the
decisions of others. As explained by Pen˜a Lo´pez and
Sa´nchez Santos (2014, p. 700), culture ‘‘…is a subliminal
system of thought that reflects the organizations of values,
norms and symbols of a particular society …[influencing]
the interactions and choices of individuals (Parsons and
Shills 1990).’’ These interactions and choices take place
within the context of the networks and relationships
between individuals, i.e., the social structure. Culture,
social structure, and social networks are therefore closely
related phenomena.
Related to this, Inkeles (2000) states that Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions are related to social capital and that
this is particularly true for individualism. In a similar vein,
Allik and Realo (2004), and Realo and Allik (2009) argue
that the possibility to act individualistically is an important
driver of the configuration of his/her social capital. In in-
dividualistic societies, it is expected that the individual
looks after himself/herself and his/her immediate family
only. In these societies, individuals focus on themselves
rather than on the group to which they belong when they
develop their networks. As a consequence, individuals in
these societies will develop their social networks according
to their own interest, i.e., they are not bound by social
norms to restrict their social interactions within their kin.
Individualism therefore is associated with a preference for
a loosely knit and broadly developed social network. In
contrast, collectivist societies rely on values and beliefs
that strongly link people into cohesive in-groups where the
group members are expected to protect each other
throughout their lifetime in exchange of unquestioning
loyalty. These common collectivist visions lead to smaller,
tightly knit social frameworks where individuals focus on
the group rather than on themselves.5
Based on the above discussion, we expect that individ-
uals coming from individualist societies have created net-
works beyond their kin, and are therefore likely to be more
successful in developing wider social networks as com-
pared to individuals coming from collectivist societies. As
MFI financial and social performance relies on the stocks
of social capital of microcredit borrowers, we expect that
MFIs perform better in individualistic societies. The indi-
vidualism index we use in this paper indicates the degree to
which a given society can be considered as individualistic.
High individualism values indicate that the society is
encouraging individuals to focus on personal achievement
and develop valuable social ties/networks.
The above discussion suggests the following
hypotheses:
H3a Operational self-sufficiency is positively associated
with the extent to which a society can be characterized as
individualistic;
H3b Female borrowing is positively associated with the
extent to which a society can be characterized as individ-
ualistic; and
H3c The loan size is negatively associated with the
extent to which a society can be characterized as
individualistic.
Methodology and Data
The empirical methodology we follow is inspired by the
work of Ahlin et al. (2011), who investigate the determi-
nants of the MFI financial performance by looking at three
categories of independent variables, i.e., macroeconomic
variables, formal institutional variables, and MFI-specific
variables. In our analysis for this paper, we add a fourth
category, i.e., our three types of social dimensions. The
baseline model can be written as follows:
Yijt ¼/ þ bMMijt þ b0X0jt þ b1X1jt þ b2X2jt
þ bincomeIncomejt1 þ bincome2 Income2jt1
þ bageAgejt þ bage2Age2jt þ eijt;
where Yijt is a vector of performance outcome measures of
MFI i in year t, located in country j. As was already
mentioned in ‘‘Hypotheses’’ section with respect to the
outcome variables, we focus on the share of female bor-
rowers, the average loan size relative to GNI per capita,
and the operational self-sufficiency. The first two measures
relate to social performance, and the third is a measure of
financial performance of MFIs. A higher value for the
operational self-sufficiency ratio is associated with better
financial performance of MFIs. If MFIs provide more loans
to women and/or if they provide smaller loans, this is seen
as showing better social performance. Mijt is a vector of
MFI-specific control variables of MFI i in country j at time
t; X0jt is a vector of macroeconomic variables describing
country j at time t; X1jt is a vector of variables describing
the formal institutional environment from country j at time
4 Although Hofstede (2001) distinguishes six dimensions of culture,
we focus on individualism, because as we will discuss below, in the
literature the relationship between individualism and social capital
has been discussed explicitly. This does not hold for the other
dimensions of culture.
5 The definitions of individualism is taken from the website developed
by Geert Hofstede; see http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.
html.
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t; and X2j is the vector containing our variables of interest,
i.e., the social dimensions describing country j.
The MFI-specific variables included in the analysis are
theMFI age, the number of borrowers, and the ratio of assets
to loan portfolio (reflecting the degree to which non-loan
assets are supporting theMFI’s lending operation), as well as
the MFI’s geographical location (i.e., dummy measuring
whether the MFI is from Latin America or the Caribbean or
from another part of the world). The data related to MFIs
come fromMixMarket, a publicly available web-based data
source, which provides detailed information with respect to
the financial and social performance of MFIs around the
world. Currently, this database contains information for over
2000 MFIs with information going back as far as the mid-
1990s. FollowingAhlin et al. (2011) and others in the field of
microfinance research, we only use data for MFIs that have
been rated with four and five diamonds in the Mix Market
dataset. These diamonds indicate the quality of the financial
statements of MFIs as published by the Mix Market, five
diamonds being the highest level of quality (i.e., the financial
statements are audited by a recognized auditing company).
We collect data for MFI-specific characteristics for the
period 1996–2012. The final dataset consists of 6934
observations covering 934 MFIs based in 100 countries.
The macroeconomic variables include the annual
growth of the real GDP per capita, the quadratic term of the
real GDP per capita, the share of manufacturing in total
GDP, measured in terms of the value added of this sector,
the total labor force as a percentage of the total population
over 15 years, the share of the industrial sector in total
GDP (in terms of value added), the share of services in
total GDP (in terms of value added), the annual inflation
rate, and net foreign direct investment inflows as a per-
centage of total GDP. The choice for these variables is
based on what has been used in other related studies (e.g.,
Ahlin et al. 2011; Hermes and Meesters 2011). Information
for the macroeconomic variables is collected from the
World Development Indicators (WDI).
With respect to the formal institutional variables, we
use a measure of the political stability and absence of
violence, a measure for the control of corruption, as well as
a measure of the rule of law, all measured at the country
level. Again, our choice of variables has been guided by the
existing literature. Data for the formal institutional vari-
ables indicators come from the Kaufmann World Gover-
nance Indicators database. The Kaufmann indicators are
available since 1996. Between 1996 and 2002, the data are
only available bi-annually. We therefore use interpolation
to create observations for the years data are not available.6
With respect to our variables of interest, we include
three types of social dimensions, i.e., fractionalization,
generalized trust, and individualism. We take three dif-
ferent measures for country-level fractionalization from
Alesina et al. (2003). These authors developed a dataset
measuring ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization
within a country. With respect to generalized trust, we
follow most of the literature and use a measure of the so-
called generalized trust, which is available in the World
Value Survey (WVS). Generalized trust is measured in the
WVS by asking the following question: ‘‘In general, do you
think that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too
careful in dealing with people?’’ As was discussed above,
we also use Geert Hofstede’s individualism index. The data
for this index are taken from Hofstede’s Cultural Dimen-
sions Data Matrix.7
Following Ahlin et al. (2011), we start by using a small
set of specifications as a source of discipline.8 We then
perform the tests by including larger sets of controls. Ahlin
et al. (2011) run pooled OLS regressions followed by
additional series of tests accounting for the MFI-level
heterogeneity. However, we are not able to do this, as our
variables of interest are time invariant. The characteristics
of our data direct our estimation strategy. Random effects
are not suitable either as it assumes that the individual-
specific effects are distributed independently of the inde-
pendent variables. It is reasonable to assume that we have
dependencies in our data as we have nested data (MFIs
nested within countries). The Hausman–Taylor estimator
for error-components model is also not suitable, as we do
not have instruments for our potentially endogenous vari-
ables and our variables of interest are time invariant. We
thus rely on OLS estimations with Huber–White
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors, and we perform
a wide range of additional robustness checks, acknowl-
edging that we are unable to fully deal with the endogeneity
concerns.9 However, since social dimensions only change
very slowly over time and given the fact that our panel data
are relatively short, we have reasons to assume that in our
case the endogeneity problem may be less severe.
In additional tests, we use standard errors clustered at
the country level. Furthermore, to address the outlier issues
6 So, for example for the year 1997, we create observations for the
formal institutional variables, by calculating the average value of a
variable based on the observations for 1996 and 1998.
7 The data were retrieved from the following website: http://www.
geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix. We do not use the data from
the GLOBE project. As is shown in the study by Manos and
Tsytrinbum (2014) using these data dramatically reduces the number
of countries for which the analysis can be carried out.
8 Table 2 provides definitions of all variables used in our analysis.
9 We prefer using OLS estimations with Huber–White heteroscedas-
tic-consistent standard errors, instead of using simple pooled OLS
regressions. The reason is that using pooled OLS regressions may
lead to an overly optimistic picture of the estimation outcomes,
because given the content and structure of our dataset the standard
OLS assumptions may be violated.
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we re-run our estimates on a trimmed sample and use
conditional median estimations.10 Finally, because our data
for the period 1996–2005 is highly unbalanced, we also
perform the estimations on the subset of data between 2006
and 2012.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the number of MFIs for which we have data
in a particular year (between 1996 and 2012). As it is clear
from this table, the bulk of the information on MFIs is
available for the years 2006–2011. For the first 4 years, the
number of observations is equal to or less than 100 per
year. These numbers indicate that the dataset we have is
unbalanced. This is the case for many papers using the Mix
Market dataset. Table 2 provides an overview of the
descriptive statistics of the variables we use in the empir-
ical analysis. The table shows that the number of obser-
vations significantly varies between the different variables.
In particular, data for Hofstede’s individualism dimension
are not available for all countries in our dataset. In total,
Hofstede’s matrix contains data on individualism for 78
countries. When we further combine the Hofstede data on
individualism with the data on MFIs from Mix Market, we
are left with only 23 countries.
With respect to our dependent variables, the descriptive
statistics show that the MFIs in our sample mainly lend to
women: two-thirds of the loans is provided to female
borrowers. This supports the idea that the general approach
taken by MFIs is to focus their lending on women as they
are considered to perform better in terms of repayment,
while at the same time making a greater social impact
(Aggarwal et al. 2015). The size of the average loan pro-
vided by an MFI in a particular country is two-thirds the
size of the average GNI per capita of that country. Finally,
the average MFI in our sample appears to be financially
sustainable as the mean of the operational self-sustain-
ability variables is above 1.
Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. The table suggests
that our financial and social performance variables do
correlate with several of the social dimensions we focus on.
Moreover, several of the correlation coefficients do seem to
have the expected positive sign. This is the first indication
that there may be a positive association between the
financial and social performance of MFIs and the social
dimensions conducive to developing social capital/ties. The
next step is to find out whether this association holds in the
setting of a multivariate analysis.11
Econometric Results
We first focus on measures of societal fractionalization
and generalized trust and their association with financial
and social performance of MFIs. The association between
individualism and the financial and social performance of
MFIs will be discussed separately, as the dataset we are
able to apply for this measure is much smaller due to lack
of data on cultural measures for a considerable number of
countries in our dataset. We do not estimate a full model
incorporating all these social dimensions, because by
doing so we would lose too many observations. More-
over, in this way we also avoid potential problems of
multicollinearity.
The results of our empirical analysis using measures of
societal fractionalization and generalized trust are
Table 1 Number of observa-
tions in the dataset Source:
Calculation by the authors based





















10 Thus, we also report our estimates using conditional median
regression, which minimizes the sum of absolute residuals rather than
the squared residuals and tends to be less susceptible to outlier
problems than least squares; see also Ahlin et al. 2011).
11 We cannot include the variables Geographic (indicating whether
the country is from Latin America or Caribbean or not) and GDP per
capita in the same regression models as the correlation between these
two variables appears to be relatively high (see the correlation matrix,
Table 3). Moreover, when adding the covariates one by one, the two
variables (i.e., Geographic and real GDP per capita) switch signs,
indicating potential multicollinearity problems. To decide what
variable to keep, we performed the regressions with the two variables
included separately and we selected the real GDP per capita as it
brought the highest explanatory power based on the adjusted
R-squared value.
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presented in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Tables 4, 5, and 6
show the results for the conditional mean regressions for
the three dependent variables, i.e., Share of Female Bor-
rowers (Table 4), Average Loan per GNI per Capita
(Table 5), and Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS;
Table 6). The results in Table 4 generally support our
hypotheses. Societal fractionalization is associated with
lower shares of female borrowers, i.e., MFIs that are active
in fractionalized societies on average lend less to women.
Moreover, lending to women is higher in high-trust coun-
tries. The results for the average loan size (Table 5) and the
OSS (Table 6) show similar patterns. Loan size is higher in
countries with high societal fractionalization and in low-
trust countries, indicating lower social performance when
MFIs are active in societies where cognitive and relational
social capital formation is difficult. OSS is lower in
countries with high societal fractionalization, suggesting
worse financial performance in these contexts.12
To address potential outlier problems, we follow Ahlin
et al. (2011) and estimate conditional median regression
models.13 The outcomes for our social dimensions are
similar to those presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6. This sup-
ports our main hypothesis that MFIs which are active in
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Description n Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variables
ShareFemBorr Share of female borrowers: number of active
female borrowers/number of active borrowers
5805 0.67 0.29 0 6.69
AvgLoanToGNIcapita Average loan per GNI per capita: average loan
balance per borrower/GNI per capita
6619 0.65 2.08 0 94.71
OSS Operational self-sufficiency: financial revenue/
(financial expense ? loan loss provision
expense ? operating expense)
6734 1.17 0.71 -0.29 36.63
MFI controls
MFI_AGE Age of the MFI (years): calculated as the year of
the observation—the year when the MFI was funded
6680 12.23 9.3 1 62
NoBorrLag_LN Ln of number of borrowers (lagged) 5682 9.3 1.8 0.69 15.92
AssetsPerGLP_LagLN Ln of Assets per GLP (lagged) 5848 0.33 0.36 -3.22 4.91
Geographic 1 if country is from Latin America or the
Caribbean, 0 otherwise
6934 0.34 0.47 0 1
Macroeconomic indicators
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP Annual growth in real GDP per capita 6645 9.12 10.73 -47.85 138.19
GDPperCapitaPPP_Lag Real GDP per capita (lagged) 5751 4550.15 3294.32 255.75 18,087.44
Manufacturing Manufacturing, value added (% GDP) 6425 15.69 6.24 0 96.58
Workforce Labor force/population aged 15? 5816 67.86 9.5 39.6 90.8
Industry Industry, value added (% of GDP) 6465 30.35 9.24 4.84 100
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 6574 7.48 6.85 -13.23 96.09
FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 6700 3.89 4.83 -5.69 84.94
Formal institutions
PS Political stability and absence of violence 6761 -0.84 0.7 -3.18 1.27
RL Rule of law 6797 -0.60 0.46 -1.96 1.37
CC Control of corruption 6797 -0.61 0.41 -1.82 1.57
Social dimensions
Ethnic Ethnic fractionalization 6694 0.48 0.22 0.04 0.93
Language Linguistic fractionalization 6539 0.42 0.31 0.01 0.92
Religion Religious fractionalization 6697 0.35 0.2 0 0.86
Trust Generalized Trust (WVS) 4317 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.53
IDV Individualism Index 3502 25.3 13.8 6 60
Based on calculations of the authors
12 We also estimated the baseline models presented in Tables 4, 5,
and 6 using simple pooled OLS regressions. The results of these
estimations are almost identical to those shown in the tables. The
pooled OLS results have not been added to the tables in the paper, but
they are available upon request from the authors.
13 We have not added these tables in the paper, but they are available
upon request from the authors.
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contexts conducive to developing social capital show
higher financial and social performance.
As a robustness check we add the estimation results for
our three measures of financial and social performance of
MFIs, in which we include the three different dimensions
of fractionalization simultaneously. These results are pre-
sented in the last column (column [5]) of Tables 4, 5, and
6. The results suggest that for two performance measures
(share of female borrowers and operational self-suffi-
ciency) religious fractionalization is most important for
explaining MFI performance. For the third performance
measure (average loan size) ethnic fractionalization
appears to be the most important explanatory dimension.
In the regression models presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6,
we use a smaller set of control variables, because for some
of the control variables we have left out, we have a sig-
nificant number of missing values. Adding all controls
leads to a drop in the number of observations for each
regression model.14 Still, as a robustness test, in Tables 7,
8, and 9 we run the same regressions as in Tables 4, 5, and
6, but this time we use a larger set of control variables. We
should note here that in the regression models presented in
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, we do not add controls that are
correlated with any of our variables of interest. The results
for our social dimensions remain largely unchanged as
compared to the results reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6.15
Once again, therefore, these results support our main
hypothesis that MFIs which are active in contexts con-
ducive to developing social capital show higher financial
and social performance.
We also redo the estimations presented in Tables 4, 5,
and 6 using standard errors clustered at the country level to
account for the fact that our data cover MFIs that are active
in the same country. Also when we use these clustered
standard errors, the results remain largely the same
(although in some cases these results are no longer statis-
tically significant).16
We then perform analyses similar to the one presented
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, but now we use a trimmed
dataset. In particular, we drop the 1 % top and bottom of
the data to further control for the potential impact of out-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































14 The number of observations used in the regression models
presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 varies between 3176 and 5805; for
Tables 7, 8, and 9 these numbers are between 2788 and 4883.
15 Due to the pairwise correlations between some of the control
variables in our models, their signs and significance may change as
compared to the first six tables.
16 The results of the estimations using clustered standard errors are
not reported in the paper but are available on request from the authors.
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Table 4 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI social performance (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr
MFI_AGE 0.00272*** (0.00104) 0.00301*** (0.00107) 0.00296*** (0.00104) 0.00275** (0.00132)
MFI_AGEsq -8.90e-05*** (2.23e-05) -8.30e-05*** (2.26e-05) -9.07e-05*** (2.23e-05) -6.73e-05** (2.80e-05)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP -0.000292 (0.000413) 0.000415 (0.000407) 0.000253 (0.000401) 0.000616 (0.000529)
GDPperCapitaPPP -6.82e-05*** (4.99e-06) -7.86e-05*** (5.00e-06) -7.81e-05*** (4.93e-06) -8.35e-05*** (7.03e-06)
GDPperCapitaPPPsq 3.99e-09*** (3.35e-10) 4.61e-09*** (3.35e-10) 4.52e-09*** (3.28e-10) 5.07e-09*** (4.46e-10)
Manufacturing 0.000435 (0.000795) 0.00171** (0.000843) 0.00186** (0.000797) 0.00269*** (0.000982)
Industry 0.000977* (0.000576) 0.00155** (0.000605) 0.00117** (0.000584) -0.00105* (0.000608)
Inflation -0.000857 (0.000719) -0.000768 (0.000867) 0.000533 (0.000876) -0.000244 (0.000861)
FDI -0.00884*** (0.00120) -0.00879*** (0.00118) -0.00783*** (0.00107) -0.0112*** (0.00106)
PS -0.0550*** (0.00673) -0.0513*** (0.00704) -0.0328*** (0.00679) -0.0371*** (0.00879)





Constant 0.967*** (0.0258) 0.893*** (0.0286) 0.971*** (0.0271) 0.929*** (0.0436)
Observations 5012 4894 4987 3176
Dependent variable: Share of female borrowers. All estimations are based on using Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
Table 5 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI social performance (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita
MFI_AGE -0.0244*** (0.00940) -0.0261** (0.0105) -0.0282*** (0.0104) -0.0160*** (0.00362)
MFI_AGEsq 0.000643*** (0.000192) 0.000592*** (0.000202) 0.000649*** (0.000201) 0.000323*** (6.94e-05)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP 0.0170* (0.00905) 0.0129 (0.00854) 0.0129 (0.00850) 0.00394* (0.00226)
GDPperCapitaPPP -0.000134*** (2.86e-05) -5.39e-05** (2.65e-05) -9.05e-05*** (2.52e-05) -7.54e-06 (1.60e-05)
GDPperCapitaPPPsq 7.18e-09*** (2.01e-09) 3.03e-09* (1.78e-09) 4.75e-09*** (1.76e-09) -1.31e-09 (9.69e-10)
Manufacturing 0.0196* (0.0119) 0.0123 (0.0111) 0.0110 (0.0110) 0.00282 (0.00429)
Industry -0.00959** (0.00374) -0.0116*** (0.00389) -0.0102*** (0.00384) -0.00490* (0.00277)
Inflation 0.00720 (0.00621) 0.00980 (0.00779) 0.00783 (0.00776) 0.00234 (0.00318)
FDI 0.0352*** (0.00977) 0.0346*** (0.0101) 0.0307*** (0.00977) 0.0320*** (0.00462)
PS 0.300*** (0.0422) 0.326*** (0.0481) 0.216*** (0.0414) 0.180*** (0.0211)





Constant 0.210 (0.206) 0.399** (0.179) 0.526*** (0.161) 0.735*** (0.0943)
Observations 5715 5575 5682 3728
Dependent variable: Average loan per GNI per capita. All estimations are based on using Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Tables 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, and 9.17
We continue discussing the analysis using the individ-
ualism dimension as a measure of the extent to which
structural social capital development is facilitated. As was
mentioned above, the dataset we are able to apply for this
variable is much smaller due to lack of data for a consid-
erable number of countries in our dataset.18 Table 10 pre-
sents the results for the conditional mean regressions for
the three dependent variables, i.e., Share of Female Bor-
rowers (column 1), Average Loan per GNI per Capita
(column 2), and Operational Self-Sufficiency (column 3).
We also perform our estimations based on conditional
median regression. The results emerging from these two
sets of regressions are very similar.19 They clearly are
supportive to the hypothesis that in individualistic societies
the social performance of MFIs is generally better. Our
measure of the individualism dimension is positively
associated with the share of female borrowers and negative
with the average loan size. With respect to financial per-
formance, we do not find supportive evidence, however.
Individualism is actually negatively associated with our
measure of operational self-sufficiency, at least when we
use the results for the conditional mean regression model.
When we use the conditional median regression model, the
coefficient for individualism remains negative, but it is no
longer significant. In additional robustness tests (not
reported), in which we run the same regressions as in
Table 10, but with a larger set of control variables, we find
very similar results.
As a final robustness test we redo all regressions pre-
sented in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (including the
robustness tests for which we use conditional median
regressions and a trimmed dataset), this time only using a
sub-sample of the dataset. As was clear from the data
description in Table 1, most information on MFIs is
available for recent years, indicating that the dataset we
have is unbalanced, especially for the earlier years. For this
robustness test, we therefore only use data from 2006 to
2012 to see whether our results still hold when we have a
less unbalanced dataset. The data for this period cover 70
% of the observations of the full dataset. The results of
these analyses (not reported) are qualitatively similar to the
ones presented in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.20
Table 6 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI financial performance (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
OSS OSS OSS OSS
MFI_AGE 0.0101*** (0.00275) 0.00965*** (0.00269) 0.00962*** (0.00256) 0.00847** (0.00370)
MFI_AGEsq -0.000192*** (5.75e-05) -0.000178*** (5.82e-05) -0.000182*** (5.65e-05) -0.000138* (7.98e-05)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP 0.00193** (0.000926) 0.00223** (0.00101) 0.00221** (0.00101) 7.66e-05 (0.00152)
GDPperCapitaPPP 2.92e-05*** (1.02e-05) 1.53e-05 (1.24e-05) 2.03e-05* (1.10e-05) 2.31e-05 (1.66e-05)
GDPperCapitaPPPsq -2.46e-09*** (7.54e-10) -1.89e-09** (8.19e-10) -2.01e-09** (7.86e-10) -2.31e-09** (1.07e-09)
Manufacturing -0.00230 (0.00171) -0.00110 (0.00150) -0.00148 (0.00142) -0.00252 (0.00262)
Industry 0.00375*** (0.00111) 0.00392*** (0.00119) 0.00378*** (0.00117) 0.00424*** (0.00151)
Inflation -0.000992 (0.00275) -0.000320 (0.00298) 0.00121 (0.00325) -0.00410 (0.00443)
FDI 0.00596 (0.00375) 0.00519 (0.00358) 0.00700* (0.00388) 0.00995 (0.00675)
PS -0.00315 (0.0129) -0.0149 (0.0166) 0.0192 (0.0143) 0.00968 (0.0179)





Constant 0.962*** (0.0816) 1.012*** (0.0762) 1.024*** (0.0662) 0.945*** (0.0972)
Observations 5805 5669 5773 3773
Dependent variable: operational self-sufficiency (OSS). All estimations are based on using Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
17 The results of these analyses not reported in the paper but are
available on request from the authors.
18 The number of observations for the regression models using
individualism as our measure of the extent to which structural social
capital development is facilitated varies between 2737 and 3207.
19 The results of these analyses not reported in the paper but are
available on request from the authors.
20 We chose not to report the results of this robustness test as this
would add another 48 tables to the already substantial number of
tables we have. However, again, the results of these robustness
analyses are available from the authors.
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Table 11 summarizes the results of the association
between our variables of interest and financial and social
performance of MFIs as shown in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
and 10. In particular, the table shows the expected sign
(discussed in ‘‘Hypotheses’’ section of this paper) as well
as the actual sign we find after estimating the models.
A ? (-) indicates that we find a positive (negative) and
significant coefficient. The general picture that emerges
from this table is that we find support for most of our
hypotheses regarding the association between our social
dimensions and the social and financial performance of
MFIs, the only exception being the association between
individualism and MFIs’ financial performance.21
Regarding endogeneity, we have taken the precautions
that our particular dataset allowed us to take, as described
in the previous section. While we cannot completely dis-
miss the possibility of unexplained individual-specific
effects, we argue that reverse causality may not be a major
issue. In particular, we believe it is far-fetched to assume
that MFIs’ social and financial performance would affect
the considered social dimensions of their countries. While
the values of these social dimensions may change over
time, they change very slowly. Microfinance has developed
starting with late 1970s and it has considerably scaled up
relatively recently. It is therefore not very likely that
microfinance has changed the values of these social
dimensions for the countries they come from.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
As was indicated in the introduction, the market for
microfinance has been booming, especially since the early
2000s. And although the global financial crisis led to a
reduction of its growth, and notwithstanding the criticism it
received especially from 2007 onwards, policy makers still
see it as an important instrument to reduce poverty by
policy makers. At the same time, the private sector has
increasingly valued microfinance as an interesting SRI tool.
This fits into the general recent trend of the increasing
Table 7 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI social performance, extended model (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr ShareFemBorr
MFI_AGE -0.00209* (0.00122) -0.00184 (0.00124) -0.00167 (0.00122) -0.00375** (0.00158)
MFI_AGEsq -9.20e-07 (2.75e-05) 5.31e-06 (2.79e-05) -6.53e-06 (2.75e-05) 4.57e-05 (3.49e-05)
NoBorrLag_LN 0.0274*** (0.00237) 0.0276*** (0.00241) 0.0271*** (0.00238) 0.0261*** (0.00313)
AssetsPerGLP_LagLN -0.0379*** (0.0121) -0.0495*** (0.0122) -0.0401*** (0.0120) -0.0509*** (0.0162)









GDPperCapitaPPP_LagSq 5.21e-09*** (4.16e-10) 5.52e-09*** (4.28e-10) 5.22e-09*** (4.20e-10) 6.89e-09*** (4.93e-10)
Manufacturing 0.000695 (0.000727) 0.00186*** (0.000714) 0.00209*** (0.000698) 0.00380*** (0.000932)
Industry 0.00406*** (0.000884) 0.00393*** (0.000903) 0.00306*** (0.000894) 0.00616*** (0.00119)
Services 0.00353*** (0.000728) 0.00329*** (0.000764) 0.00282*** (0.000755) 0.00727*** (0.000944)
Inflation -0.000393 (0.000789) -0.000597 (0.000854) 0.000337 (0.000855) 0.000985 (0.00106)
FDI -0.00857*** (0.000910) -0.00836*** (0.000927) -0.00759*** (0.000914) -0.0113*** (0.00133)
PS -0.0321*** (0.00708) -0.0248*** (0.00737) -0.0121* (0.00704) -0.00620 (0.00965)
RL 0.0788*** (0.0150) 0.116*** (0.0147) 0.129*** (0.0140) 0.0531** (0.0212)





Constant 0.538*** (0.0574) 0.470*** (0.0596) 0.570*** (0.0580) 0.258*** (0.0758)
Observations 4392 4286 4368 2788
R2 0.212 0.206 0.212 0.256
Dependent variable: Share of female borrowers. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
21 When we use data for the period 2006–2012 only, however, we do
find weak evidence for a positive association between individualism
and MFIs’ financial performance.
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popularity of this type of investments (combining inves-
tors’ financial objectives with concerns about environ-
mental, social, and governance issues) around the world.
Yet, in order to be able to secure sustained interest from
private investors, it is important that MFIs can show evi-
dence of their contribution to reducing poverty. It is,
therefore, very important that we have a better under-
standing of the conditions that enable MFIs to contribute to
poverty reduction in a financially sustainable way.
Previous research has investigated institution-specific
factors, macroeconomic factors, and the formal institu-
tional context as drivers of MFI financial and social per-
formance. We add to this research by focusing on the
relationship between the performance of MFIs and the
extent to which social capital formation is facilitated in
different countries. We render this as a potentially impor-
tant driver of MFI performance, because the lending model
many of these institutions still use extensively crucially
depends on the availability and quality of social capital.
We use three types of social dimensions—i.e., frac-
tionalization, generalized trust, and individualism—to
proxy for the extent to which social capital formation is
facilitated. In particular, a society’s fractionalization indi-
cates how easy/difficult is for individuals to develop cog-
nitive social capital. Generalized trust indicates to what
extent different societies are conducive of the development
of relational social capital (i.e., how fast individuals can
build respect, acceptance, friendship, sociability through
social interactions). Individualist societies better facilitate
the development of structural social capital (i.e., expanding
social networks beyond the kin).
We use data from a sample of 100 countries to
identify how country variations in terms of these social
dimensions explain variation in the MFIs financial and
social performance. Overall, our results indicate that
MFIs perform better, in terms of both financial and social
objectives, in societies where social capital can be
developed more easily. Most importantly, we find that
MFIs active in societies characterized by higher (lin-
guistic, ethnic, and religious) fractionalization and high-
trust societies show lower financial and social perfor-
mance. These results are very stable over a large number
of model specifications, data sub-samples, and estimation
methods. Moreover, we find that in individualistic
Table 8 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI social performance, extended model (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita AvgLoanToGNIcapita
MFI_AGE 0.00119 (0.00739) -0.000156 (0.00756) -0.00194 (0.00744) -0.00392 (0.00322)
MFI_AGEsq 0.000167 (0.000163) 0.000128 (0.000167) 0.000177 (0.000165) 0.000109 (6.97e-05)
NoBorrLag_LN -0.102*** (0.0142) -0.103*** (0.0146) -0.107*** (0.0144) -0.0363*** (0.00633)
AssetsPerGLP_LagLN 0.234*** (0.0716) 0.266*** (0.0731) 0.250*** (0.0723) 0.0325 (0.0325)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP 0.00804*** (0.00256) 0.00531** (0.00258) 0.00503** (0.00256) 0.00331*** (0.00125)
GDPperCapitaPPP_Lag -1.27e-05 (3.98e-05) 1.28e-05 (4.16e-05) -1.52e-05 (4.07e-05) 0.000117*** (1.65e-05)
GDPperCapitaPPP_LagSq 8.04e-10 (2.52e-09) -8.41e-10 (2.61e-09) 5.63e-10 (2.56e-09) -6.59e-09*** (1.02e-09)
Manufacturing 0.0106** (0.00428) 0.00295 (0.00423) 0.00142 (0.00414) 0.00260 (0.00186)
Industry -0.0241*** (0.00531) -0.0219*** (0.00545) -0.0215*** (0.00541) -0.0316*** (0.00241)
Services -0.0136*** (0.00422) -0.0129*** (0.00440) -0.0138*** (0.00437) -0.0225*** (0.00185)
Inflation -0.00347 (0.00482) -0.00230 (0.00521) -0.00334 (0.00522) -0.00403* (0.00221)
FDI 0.0424*** (0.00562) 0.0416*** (0.00575) 0.0387*** (0.00569) 0.0348*** (0.00277)
PS 0.241*** (0.0429) 0.239*** (0.0451) 0.150*** (0.0428) 0.131*** (0.0198)
RL -0.232** (0.0918) -0.587*** (0.0914) -0.498*** (0.0866) 0.0234 (0.0432)





Constant 1.951*** (0.345) 2.231*** (0.356) 2.460*** (0.348) 2.562*** (0.153)
Observations 4883 4757 4851 3178
R2 0.082 0.076 0.074 0.200
Dependent variable: Average loan per GNI per capita. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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Table 9 Fractionalization, generalized trust, and MFI financial performance, extended model (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
OSS OSS OSS OSS
MFI_AGE 0.00887*** (0.00323) 0.00848*** (0.00329) 0.00868*** (0.00324) 0.00685 (0.00448)
MFI_AGEsq -0.000158** (7.13e-05) -0.000148** (7.26e-05) -0.000158** (7.15e-05) -0.000110 (9.65e-05)
NoBorrLag_LN -0.00535 (0.00624) -0.00653 (0.00636) -0.00615 (0.00627) 0.000345 (0.00881)
AssetsPerGLP_LagLN -0.171*** (0.0322) -0.168*** (0.0328) -0.163*** (0.0324) -0.169*** (0.0466)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP 0.00151 (0.00112) 0.00156 (0.00112) 0.00154 (0.00111) -0.000698 (0.00176)
GDPperCapitaPPP_Lag -5.74e-06 (1.75e-05) -1.24e-05 (1.81e-05) -6.00e-06 (1.77e-05) -9.32e-06 (2.31e-05)
GDPperCapitaPPP_LagSq -6.93e-10 (1.11e-09) -4.85e-10 (1.14e-09) -6.63e-10 (1.12e-09) -9.40e-10 (1.43e-09)
Manufacturing -0.00124 (0.00188) -0.000474 (0.00185) -0.000838 (0.00181) -0.000301 (0.00260)
Industry 0.00633*** (0.00233) 0.00553** (0.00238) 0.00523** (0.00236) 0.00960*** (0.00336)
Services 0.00299 (0.00184) 0.00229 (0.00191) 0.00208 (0.00189) 0.00595** (0.00256)
Inflation 0.000523 (0.00221) 0.000385 (0.00225) 0.00182 (0.00225) -0.000420 (0.00334)
FDI 0.00573** (0.00246) 0.00489* (0.00250) 0.00686*** (0.00247) 0.00940** (0.00385)
PS -0.0130 (0.0187) -0.0232 (0.0196) 0.00621 (0.0186) 0.00595 (0.0275)
RL -0.0553 (0.0403) -0.0125 (0.0398) -0.0173 (0.0378) -0.0277 (0.0601)





Constant 0.927*** (0.151) 1.053*** (0.155) 1.066*** (0.152) 0.610*** (0.214)
Observations 4874 4752 4843 3171
R2 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.017
Dependent variable: operational self-sufficiency (OSS). Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
Table 10 Individualism trust and MFI social and financial performance (conditional mean regressions)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
ShareFemBorr AvgLoanToGNIcapita Operational Self-Sufficiency
MFI_AGE 0.00202 (0.00141) -0.00239 (0.00245) 0.0107** (0.00429)
MFI_AGEsq -8.35e-05*** (3.10e-05) 0.000189*** (5.06e-05) -0.000221*** (7.91e-05)
GrowthGDPcapitaPPP -0.000647 (0.000788) 0.00580*** (0.00169) 0.000451 (0.00131)
GDPperCapitaPPP -9.73e-05*** (5.59e-06) 1.00e-04*** (1.06e-05) -1.51e-05 (2.54e-05)
GDPperCapitaPPPsq 5.08e-09*** (3.70e-10) -6.33e-09*** (6.54e-10) 8.37e-11 (1.47e-09)
Manufacturing -0.00415*** (0.000995) 0.00607*** (0.00201) -0.00517** (0.00204)
Industry 0.00437*** (0.00103) -0.00761*** (0.00209) 0.00539*** (0.00178)
Inflation -0.00286*** (0.000977) 0.00569*** (0.00218) -0.00790** (0.00345)
FDI -0.00570*** (0.00177) 0.00850* (0.00444) 0.00685** (0.00275)
PS 0.00180 (0.00869) 0.108*** (0.0152) 0.0462* (0.0243)
RL -0.0436*** (0.0160) 0.146** (0.0661) -0.0819** (0.0341)
idv 0.00558*** (0.000561) -0.00757*** (0.00179) -9.65e-05 (0.000988)
Constant 0.853*** (0.0433) 0.388*** (0.110) 1.125*** (0.198)
Observations 2737 3183 3207
R2 0.295 0.146 0.019
All estimations are based on using Huber–White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses
*** p\ 0.01, ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
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societies social performance of MFIs is higher, which is
in line with our hypothesis. We do not find support for
our hypothesis that financial performance of MFIs is
higher in individualistic societies.
The results of this study have clear policy relevance.
They suggest that the success of microfinance models
depends on the extent to which the society is conducive to
social capital development. In practical terms, this means
that simply copying models such as group lending from
one context to the other may lead to failure. In the past,
MFIs have followed this strategy. The success of the
Grameen Bank led to setting up similar microfinance ini-
tiatives around the world. Yet, the mechanism of the
Grameen Bank model is rather specific. It may work well
in the societal context of Bangladesh and other South Asian
countries. This does not mean, however, that the model can
be equally successful in the context of, for example,
African countries.
This message may be important for MFIs when evalu-
ating the performance of their operations and the type of
financial services they provide. It may also be highly rel-
evant for MFIs that are about to establish a (new) branch in
a different region or country and have to consider which
lending technology to use. The country context in which
they (are about to) work may well determine the success of
some types of lending technologies, while it may be barrier
for the success of others.
Our study sheds light on the characteristics of the social
contexts in which microfinance can be successful. This
may contribute by raising awareness that microfinance is
perhaps not the best solution to cater for the financial needs
of all poor individuals around the world. This may call for
other innovative solutions that are better suited for certain
social contexts.
Future research may look into questions that focus on
better understanding why established microfinance models
work in one context, while they are failing in other con-
texts, by explicitly taking into account the difference in the
societies’ capacities to facilitate social capital formation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Aggarwal, R., Goodell, J. W., & Selleck, L. J. (2015). Lending to
women in microfinance: Role of social trust. International
Business Review, 24(1), 55–65.
Ahlin, C., Lin, J., & Maio, M. (2011). Where does microfinance
flourish? Microfinance institution performance in macroeco-
nomic context. Journal of Development Economics, 95(2),
105–120.
Ahlin, C., & Townsend, R. (2007). Using repayment data to test
across models of joint liability lending. Economic Journal,
117(517), F11–F51.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., &
Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic
Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
Allik, J., & Realo, A. (2004). Individualism-collectivism and social
capital. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(1), 29–49.
Armendariz, B., & Labie, M. (2011). Handbook of microfinance.
Singapore: World Scientific.
Banerjee, A., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., & Kinnan, C. (2013). The
miracle of microfinance? Evidence from a randomized evalua-
tion, NBER Working Paper No. 18950. Cambridge: National
Bureau of Economic Research
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. (2010). Building sustainable hybrid
organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organiza-
tions. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1419–1440.
Bauchet, J., Marshall, C., Starita, L., Thomas, J., & Yalouris, A.
(2011). Latest findings from randomized evaluations of micro-
finance, access to finance forum reports by CGAP and its
partners, No. 2, December
Biswas, S. (2010). India’s micro-finance suicide epidemic. BBC
News, Medak, Andhra Pradesh, updated 16 December 2010.
Accessed May 18, 2016, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-southasia-11997571.
Bjørnskov, C. (2006). Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-
country comparison. Public Choice, 130(1–2), 1–21.
Burzynska, K., & Berggren, O. (2015). The impact of social beliefs
on microfinance performance. Journal of International Devel-
opment, 27(7), 1074–1097.
Table 11 Summary of the results using different social dimensions
measures Source: This table shows the results from estimating the
baseline model to which one of our social dimensions has been added
(one by one). The table shows the expected sign (discussed in
‘‘Methodology and Data’’ section of this paper) as well as the actual
sign we find after estimating the models. A ? (-) indicates that we
find a positive (negative) and significant coefficient for a certain
variable
Social dimensions Female borrowing Operational self-sufficiency Loan size
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual
Fractionalization - - - - ? ?
Trust ? ? ? ? - -
Individualism ? ? ? 0/- - -
444 L. Postelnicu, N. Hermes
123
Cassar, A., Crowley, L., & Wydick, B. (2007). The effect of social
capital on group loan repayment: Evidence from field experi-
ments. Economic Journal, 117(517), F85–F106.
Collins, D., Morduch, J., Rutherford, S., & Ruthven, O. (2009).
Portfolios of the poor: How the world’s poor live on $2 a day.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dufhues, T., Buchenrieder, G., Euler, D. G., & Munkung, N. (2011a).
Network based social capital and individual loan repayment
performance. Journal of Development Studies, 47(8),
1199–1215.
Dufhues, T., Buchenrieder, G., & Munkung, N. (2013). Social capital
and market imperfections: Accessing formal credit in Thailand.
Oxford Development Studies, 41(1), 54–75.
Dufhues, T., Buchenrieder, G., & Quoc, H. D. (2012). Social capital
and loan repayment performance in Northern Vietnam. Agricul-
tural Economics, 43(3), 277–292.
Dufhues, T., Buchenrieder, G., Quoc, H. D., & Munkung, N. (2011b).
Social capital and loan repayment performance in Southeast
Asia. Journal of Socio-Economics, 40(5), 679–691.
El-Zoghbi, M., Ga¨hwiler, B., & Lauer, K. (2011). Cross-border
funding of microfinance. CGAP Focus Note No. 70
Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of
prosperity. New York: Free Press.
Hermes, N., Lensink, R., & Mehrteab, H. T. (2005). Peer monitoring,
social ties and moral hazard in group lending programs:
Evidence from eritrea. World Development, 33(1), 149–169.
Hermes, N., & Meesters, A. (2011). The performance of microfinance
institutions: Do macro conditions matter. In B. Armendariz & M.
Labie (Eds.), The handbook of microfinance (pp. 173–201).
Singapore: World Scientific.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values,
behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hudon, M. (2011). Ethics in microfinance. In B. Armendariz & M.
Labie (Eds.), The handbook of microfinance (pp. 123–138).
Singapore: World Scientific.
Hudon, M., & Sandberg, J. (2013). The ethical crisis in microfinance:
Issues, findings, and implications. Business Ethics Quarterly,
23(4), 561–589.
Inkeles, A. (2000). Measuring social capital and its consequences.
Policy Sciences, 33(3/4), 245–268.
Juhasz, C. J. (2016). Behind the most successful microfinance IPO in
India’s history: What does gender lens investing have to do with
it? Accessed May 31, 2016, from http://nextbillion.net/behind-
the-most-successful-microfinance-ipo-in-indias-history-what-doe
s-gender-lens-investing-have-to-do-with-it/.
Karlan, D. (2007). Social connections and group banking. Economic
Journal, 117(517), F52–F84.
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have and
economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251–1288.
Lewis, J. C. (2008). Microloan sharks. Stanford Social Innovation
Review, 6(3), 54–59.
Mader, P. (2013). Rise and fall of microfi nance in India: The Andhra
Pradesh crisis in perspective. Strategic Change, 22(1–2), 47–66.
Manos, R., & Tsytrinbaum, L. (2014). Determinants of performance
in the microfinance industry: The role of culture. In R. Mersland
& Ø. Strøm (Eds.), Microfinance institutions: Financial and
social performance (pp. 53–78). Palgrave McMillan:
Basingstoke.
Masanjala, W. H. (2002). Can the Grameen Bank be replicated in
Africa? Evidence from Malawi. Canadian Journal of Develop-
ment Studies, 23(1), 87–103.
Mersland, R., D’Espallier, B., & Supphellen, M. (2013). The effects
of religion on development efforts: Evidence from the microfi-
nance industry and a research agenda. World Development,
41(1), 145–156.
Mersland, R., Randøy, T., & Stro¨m, Ø. (2011). The impact of
international influence on microbanks’ performance: A global
survey. International Business Review, 20(2), 163–176.
Money Control. (2016). Ujjivan IPO a top draw: Gets oversubscribed




Morduch, J. (1999). The microfinance promise. Journal of Economic
Literature, 37(4), 1569–1614.
Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital
and the organizational advantage. Academy of Management
Review, 23(2), 242–266.
Parsons, T., & Shills, E. (1990). Values and social systems. In J.
Alexander & S. Seidman (Eds.), Culture and society: Contem-
porary debates (pp. 39–46). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Pen˜a Lo´pez, J. A., & Sa´nchez Santos, J. M. (2014). Does corruption
have social roots? The role of culture and social capital. Journal
of Business Ethics, 122(4), 697–708.
Pohl, M., & Tolhurst, N. (2010). Responsible business: How to
manage a CSR Strategy Successfully. Chichester: Wiley.
Realo, A., & Allik, J. (2009). On the relationship between social
capital and individualism-collectivism. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 3(6), 871–886.
Sundeen, L., & Johnson, D. K. (2012). It’s not what you know, it’s
who knows what you know: An econometric analysis of the
effectiveness of microfinance in the presence of endogenous peer
effects. Colorado College Working Paper 2012-2017
Vaessen, J., & Bastiaensen, J. (1999). Social capital and institutions:
In search of a conceptual framework for the analysis of local
rural development. UFSIA Research Paper 036. http://anet.
uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/3599cb/f03d20c7.pdf
Wagner, C., & Winkler, A. (2013). The vulnerability of microfinance
to financial turmoil: Evidence from the global financial crisis.
World Development, 51, 71–90.
Walker, I. (2012). Is social capital fungible? The rise and fall of the
Sanduk Microcredit Project in Ngazidja. Journal of Eastern
African Studies, 6(4), 709–726.
Wydick, B., Karp Hayes, H., & Hilliker Kempf, S. (2011). Social
networks, neighborhood effects and credit access. World Devel-
opment, 39(6), 974–982.
Wydick, W. B. (1999). Can social cohesion be harnessed to repair
market failures? Evidence from group lending in Guatemala.
Economic Journal, 109(457), 463–475.
Microfinance Performance and Social Capital: A Cross-Country Analysis 445
123
